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In this issue of Neuron, Fetsch et al. (2014) show that microstimulation of motion-sensitive neurons in the
visual cortex (MT/MST) of primates mimics the addition of sensory information for which the stimulated
neurons are selective. Such microstimulation increases the confidence that monkeys have in their decisions
about motion direction.Confidence in our decisions is affected by
the amount of evidence available to make
them. Decisions based on ambiguous
information are accompanied by a sense
that our choice might not be correct
(Bach and Dolan, 2012; Beck et al.,
2008). An outcome of seven heads out
of ten flips, for example, is not sufficient
information to decide about the fairness
of a coin (or a coin flipper [Gelman and
Nolan, 2002]), and we would be better
off by not committing to a yes/no categor-
ical answer. However, a coin landing 70
heads out of 100 flips can be called unfair,
and we can have great certainty about our
answer. Thus, although the proportion
is the same in both examples, a larger
amount of evidence makes us more
confident about our choice.
We now know that the perception of
certainty that accompanies choices is
also experienced by other animals, such
as rats and monkeys. Clever behavioral
methods have shown that these animals
will bet for a large reward when they are
confident about a choice and that they
would choose a smaller but certain
reward when the available evidence
ambiguously points to the options.
In this issue of Neuron, Fetsch et al.
(2014) make use of a postdecision wager
task (Kepecs and Mainen, 2012; Persaud
et al., 2007) in which monkeys could
choose the correct of two options, and
get a large reward, or choose a third
‘‘sure bet’’ option and receive a smaller
but certain reward. The monkeys
observed a patch of noisily moving dots
on a computer monitor and had to make
an eye movement to indicate whether
the dots were moving preferentially to
left or to the right. Only correct choiceswere rewarded when monkeys decided
to look at the left or the right target, and
they always received a smaller reward
when choosing the centrally positioned
sure bet target. Thus, monkeys not only
had to decide whether the dots were
moving to the left or to the right but also
whether the sensory evidence was strong
enough to discard the smaller reward and
risk for one of the two choices.
The behavioral results show that the
monkeys sometimes chose the smaller
reward offered by the sure bet option
and they did this preferentially on trials in
which the motion information was weak.
This is consistent with the notion that
monkeys chose the sure bet when they
were not sure about the direction of
motion. However, the crucial behavioral
result was that the proportion of correct
responses increased in the group of
trials in which the sure bet was available,
and this was true even for weak motion
stimuli. This is a key result because it
implies that they did not choose the sure
bet indiscriminately on low-strength
amplitudes—a behavior that would have
not changed the proportion of correct
responses. Instead, the fact that perfor-
mance improves indicates that monkeys
preferentially discarded those trials in
which sensory information (or its readout)
was unreliable.
What is the neuronal mechanism under-
lying the sense of confidence that allows
monkeys to identify unreliable decisions?
Recent experiments show that, for deci-
sions communicated with eye move-
ments, a neuronal correlate of confidence
might be represented in the same neurons
that accumulate the sensory evidence
used to select the saccadic movementsNeuron 83that communicate the choices (Kiani and
Shadlen, 2009). These neurons, located
in the lateral intraparietal area (LIP),
change their firing rate in proportion to
the strength of motion stimuli, reflecting
the accumulation of sensory evidence in
favor or against a particular saccadic
eye movement. The experiments show
that monkeys choose the sure bet when
the accumulated evidence does not reach
beyond a threshold value. These parietal
neurons, thus, encode in their firing rate
a decision variable that can be used to
make decisions and also reflect the con-
fidence in a straightforward manner: the
decision to answer left or right is deter-
mined by the sign of the change in the
activity, and the confidence is encoded
by how far the activity moves away from
the starting point, taking into account
elapsed time (see Figure 1).
In the new study on this issue of
Neuron, Fetsch et al. (2014) aimed to
test a direct implication of the previous
results: if the accumulation of sensory
evidence underlies decision making, then
a manipulation of sensory evidence will
affect choices and, importantly, also will
affect the confidence subjects have on
their decisions. To test this association,
Fetsch et al. (2014) artificially activated
neurons in the motion-sensitive areas
MT/MST by means of microstimulation.
Microstimulation allows the experimenter
to activate neurons by injecting low-
current pulses through an electrode
tip placed within the cortex. This is a
powerful technique that allows neuro-
scientists to test possible causal links
between neuronal activity, perception,
and behavior. Previous results have
shown that microstimulation of sensory, August 20, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 751
Evidence in favor
of choice B
Evidence in favor
of choice A
Choose option A
Choose option B
Choose “Sure bet”
Time
Figure 1. An Accumulation-to-Bound Model Incorporating a Confidence Threshold
A decision is made when the accumulated evidence hits a bound (blue trace). If the stimulus turns off and
the accumulated evidence endswithin the yellow area, subjects do not commit to a categorical choice and
instead choose a ‘‘sure bet’’ option (red trace). If the stimulus turns off and the evidence is large enough,
subjects make a choice based on the sign of the ending point (green trace).
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et al., 1990), or even altogether substitute
(Romo et al., 1998), sensory evidence.
That microstimulation was able to
modify the amount of sensory information
was a firmly established experimental
result. But how is confidence affected by
microstimulation? Couldmicrostimulation
affect the confidence that monkeys
experience in their decisions? The effect
of microstimulation on confidence is not
a trivial question to ask. Microstimulation
in areas MT/MST directly activates a
group of high-level visual neurons, by-
passing the natural flow of visual infor-
mation. A moving object within the visual
space generates a cascade of activity
that, in its most direct route, travels from
the retina, through the lateral geniculate
nucleus of the thalamus, V1, V2, to finally
reach MT and MST. Neuronal networks
calculating confidence might require
access to the neuronal representation of
motion in any number of those processing
nodes.
In the key experimental manipulation,
Fetsch et al. (2014) microstimulated the
motion-selective neurons of MT/MST in
randomly selected trials of the postdeci-752 Neuron 83, August 20, 2014 ª2014 Elsevsion wager task. The results show the
artificial activation of neurons contributed
to the sensory evidence for which the
neurons were selective for. When left-
ward-selective neurons were stimulated,
the monkeys chose the left choice
more often, just as if motion in that
direction was stronger. These results
confirmed previous experiments showing
that microstimulation biases the mon-
keys’ choices toward the direction
preferred by the stimulated neurons and
that this shortens the time monkeys take
to make a decision favoring that direction.
The novel and exciting finding, how-
ever, was that the confidence reports of
the monkeys changed in agreement with
the hypothesis that microstimulation
added or subtracted sensory evidence:
when the preferred direction of the
stimulated neurons agreed with the visual
motion, monkeys chose the sure bet less
often, as if the sensory stimulus was
stronger and they were more certain of
their choices. Conversely, they chose
the sure bet more often when micro-
stimulation activated neurons that pro-
vided motion information opposing the
direction of the real stimulus.ier Inc.A somehow enigmatic finding is that
monkeys seemed to be unable to detect
the presence of microstimulation. It is
important to note that microstimulation
adds motion information that reduces
the monkeys’ sensibility in the direction
opposite to the stimulated neurons,
shifting the discrimination curves, and
reducing the amount of reward that mon-
keys could get. The monkeys reacted
to this with an opposite direction bias,
somehow compensating for the addi-
tional motion information introduced
artificially. However, the results show
that the compensating bias was present
in trials with, and also without, micro-
stimulation. Had the monkeys been able
to detect the presence of microstimula-
tion, they could have compensated for
the artificial motion information but only
on the microstimulated trials. This result
is enigmatic because it is known that
monkeys can be trained to detect the
presence of microstimulation in several
cortical areas. A plausible interpre-
tation for these conflicting results is that
microstimulation induces a perceptual
phenomenon that monkeys can be
trained to respond to but that artificial
percept is not distinguishable from the
natural stimulus or behavioral conditions
that normally activate the stimulated
neurons. Future experiments are needed
in which monkeys could be explicitly
asked to distinguish microstimulation-
induced percepts from natural stimuli.
To formally test the assumption that
microstimulation acted like additional
motion information, Fetsch et al. (2014)
made use of the accumulation-to-bound
model (see Figure 1) (Palmer et al., 2005),
incorporating the electrical stimulation as
an additional parameter that increased
the strength of motion information in the
direction preferred by the stimulated
neurons. Remarkably, the fitted model
not only explained the shift in the propor-
tion of sure bet choices but also pre-
dicted, with astonishing accuracy, the
shift in the left/right choices induced by
microstimulation.
If, as the model fittings suggest, micro-
stimulation affects choice and confidence
by acting like an increase in motion
information, then the results should be
replicated by introducing an actual
increment in the strength of the real
sensory stimulus. That was exactly what
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experiment: an offset in the motion coher-
ence of the real stimulus biases the mon-
keys’ choices and confidence ratings just
like microstimulation did.
In an elegant control experiment,
Fetsch et al. (2014) sought to break the
system apart. Instead of using low cur-
rents to stimulate a small patch of neurons
with similar preferred orientations, the
authors now injected a large amount of
current that recruited a wider population
of neurons including disparate preferred
motion directions. This widespread acti-
vation resulted in a large increase in the
number of sure bet choices, indicating
that monkeys experienced noisy motion
information and less confident decisions.
The result illustrates at least two impor-
tant issues. First, it demonstrates that
monkeys are capable of reporting a large
decrease in confidence and, second, it
shows that the behavioral consequences
ofmicrostimulation are exquisitely depen-
dent on the selectivity of the stimu-
lated neurons. Large stimulation currents,
instead of injecting additional information,
indiscriminately recruit neuronal popula-tions whose contributions can mask sub-
tle sensory representations.
The results reported by Fetsch et al.
(2014) demonstrate that the mechanisms
that read sensory evidence have access
to the additional information added by
microstimulation at the level of MT/MST.
Future experiments should be aimed
to identify the downstream neuronal cir-
cuits that read this evidence to decide
whether to choose a safe bet or to risk
for a larger reward. Importantly, these cir-
cuits must have learned, during behav-
ioral training, the association between
the amount of accumulated evidence
and the likelihood that a given answer
will be correct. What are the neuronal cor-
relates of this learning? The answer will
likely include the orchestrating functions
of the frontal cortices, and also the modu-
latory effects of subcortical projection
systems (de Lafuente and Romo, 2011;
Schultz, 2013).REFERENCES
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Oscillatory activity in the basolateral amygdala (BLA) is critical for emotional behavior. In this issue of
Neuron, Stujenske et al. (2014) describe novel dynamics of BLA theta-gamma-coupled neuronal oscillations
associated with conditioned and innate fear.Neuronal theta (4–10 Hz) and gamma
band (30–80 Hz) synchrony, which can
be detected in the neocortex and asso-
ciated areas of mammals including
humans, subserves several cognitive
functions. Notably, these two oscillatory
bands can interact with each other, and
their interplay represents a fascinating
area of investigation. During specific
sensory and cognitive experiences, the
power of the gamma rhythm is modulatedby theta oscillations, as theta provides
an ideal substrate of timing, suitable to
define the onset of a stimulus. Specif-
ically, the theta-gamma code could be
relevant for the recall of a memory linked
with salient stimuli, such as a reward or
a noxious stimulus. Phase-amplitude
cross-frequency coupling (CFC) between
theta and gamma is an index of the mod-
ulation of the gamma power by the phase
of the theta oscillations (Canolty et al.,2006). Stronger CFC can be detected in
the hippocampus when an animal learns
the association between an item and its
spatial context (Tort et al., 2009).
The BLA, hippocampus (HPC), and
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), three
interconnected brain structures involved
in fear and anxiety, display synchronized
theta oscillations correlated with fear
memory (Seidenbecher et al., 2003).
Although it is known that BLA gamma, August 20, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 753
